Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences

In the Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 1, R.D. Blair and D. Sokol, eds., Oxford University Press, 2014

Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-41

21 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2012 Last revised: 21 Apr 2015

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: August 23, 2012

Abstract

Since China has modeled its antitrust regime on that of the EU, there are essentially two antitrust regime types: the U.S. and the EU. This chapter is a brief comparative study of the two regimes. I focus on three categories in which fundamental differences are observed: enforcement, legal standards, and procedure. Within each of the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. With respect to enforcement, the EU imposes gain-based penalties while the U.S. imposes harm-based penalties. In predation law, the U.S. has a marginal cost standard and the EU has an average cost standard. With respect to procedure, the U.S. is a common law system, while the EU’s procedure is closer to the civil law system in its allocation of power between the courts and the enforcement agency. These differences have profound implications for the welfare consequences of global antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: antitrust enforcement, international competition law, comparative antitrust law, antitrust economics

JEL Classification: L40, L49

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences (August 23, 2012). In the Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 1, R.D. Blair and D. Sokol, eds., Oxford University Press, 2014; Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-41. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2135065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2135065

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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