Hindering a Hindrance to Freedom

Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethic 16, 227-250, 2008

28 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2012

See all articles by Arthur Ripstein

Arthur Ripstein

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

Kant’s discussion of punishment has probably generated more scholarly attention than any other aspect of his legal and political thought. Much of that attention has focused on his endorsement of a retributive principle; recent discussions have sought to integrate Kant's retributive remarks principle with his explicit references to deterrence. A successful integration of deterrence and retribution promises to bridge the divide between the two intuitive ideas that animate both popular and scholarly discussions of punishment. The first says that we punish criminals because we don’t want people to commit crimes; the second that we punish criminals because of the crimes they have committed. My aim, which I will claim that Kant shares, is more ambitious: to argue that each requires the other.

Keywords: Kant, deterrence, punishment, retribution

Suggested Citation

Ripstein, Arthur, Hindering a Hindrance to Freedom (2008). Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethic 16, 227-250, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2135215

Arthur Ripstein (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
(416) 978-0735 (Phone)
(416) 978-2648 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
245
Abstract Views
1,301
rank
146,331
PlumX Metrics