The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Firm Level Perspective Survey

Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming

Posted: 25 Aug 2012 Last revised: 11 Dec 2013

See all articles by Patricia Crifo

Patricia Crifo

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie; Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

Vanina D. Forget

Ecole Polytechnique ParisTech - Department of Economics

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Date Written: december 2013

Abstract

This article analyzes the economics of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as a private response to market imperfections to satisfy social preferences. Depending on whether they affect regulation, competition, or contracts, market imperfections driving CSR decisions are classified in three categories: public goods and bads and altruism; imperfect competition and incomplete contracts. Such drivers of CSR decisions are presented successively, highlighting the nature of incentives (external or internal) at work and the testable (and tested) hypotheses in the reviewed studies. We finally review the link between CSR and financial performance, but also between CSR and social and environmental performance.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Firm Strategy, Market Imperfections, Review

JEL Classification: M14, L20, D21

Suggested Citation

Crifo, Patricia and Forget, Vanina D., The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Firm Level Perspective Survey (december 2013). Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2135431

Patricia Crifo (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91128
France

Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics

Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France

Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal H3C 3J7, Quebec
Canada

Vanina D. Forget

Ecole Polytechnique ParisTech - Department of Economics ( email )

Palaiseau Cedex, F-91128
France

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