Choosing between the Government and the Regions: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions
47 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2012
Date Written: August 24, 2012
We test the extent to which political variables can explain the behavior of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions. We study two competing hypotheses. One hypothesis argues that we should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. Another hypothesis suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government. Unlike previous literature, our empirical results seem to confirm that when the Rapporteur and the Court’s majority are allegedly affiliated with the Prime Minister’s coalition, the odds of success of the Prime Minister go up.
Keywords: judicial behavior, constitutional court, comparative judicial politics, Italy
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation