Choosing between the Government and the Regions: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions

47 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2012

See all articles by Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: August 24, 2012

Abstract

We test the extent to which political variables can explain the behavior of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions. We study two competing hypotheses. One hypothesis argues that we should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. Another hypothesis suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government. Unlike previous literature, our empirical results seem to confirm that when the Rapporteur and the Court’s majority are allegedly affiliated with the Prime Minister’s coalition, the odds of success of the Prime Minister go up.

Keywords: judicial behavior, constitutional court, comparative judicial politics, Italy

Suggested Citation

Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia and Garoupa, Nuno, Choosing between the Government and the Regions: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions (August 24, 2012). European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 52, 2013; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS13-05; Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2135621. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2135621

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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