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Games on Networks

Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, eds., Elsevier Science, July 2014

89 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2012 Last revised: 18 Jul 2014

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1, 2014

Abstract

We provide an overview and synthesis of the literatures analyzing games in which players are connected via a network structure. We discuss, in particular, the impact of the structure of the network on individuals' behaviors. We focus on game theoretic modeling, but also include some discussion of analyses of peer effects, as well as applications to diffusion, employment, crime, industrial organization, and education.

Keywords: network games, social networks, games on networks, graphical games, games with incomplete information, peer effects

JEL Classification: D85, C72, A14

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Zenou, Yves, Games on Networks (January 1, 2014). Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, eds., Elsevier Science, July 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2136179

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )

180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

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