Auctions of Real Options

51 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2012 Last revised: 16 Jun 2019

See all articles by Lin William Cong

Lin William Cong

Cornell University; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

Governments and corporations frequently auction assets with embedded real options using both cash and contingent bids. I characterize equilibrium bidding and option exercise strategies, and find that the moral hazard associated with uncontractible investment timing inefficiently and asymmetrically accelerates or delays investments. I use a mechanism design approach instead of the conventional"steepness'" concept to rank securities and derive the optimal security. Furthermore, without sellers' commitment to the security design, as seen in informal auctions such as corporate acquisitions, all auction equilibria are equivalent to cash auctions, and investments are socially efficient. The results are broadly consistent with empirical observations, for example in the sales of oil leases.

Keywords: Auctions; Acquisitions; Oil and Gas; Real Options; Security Design; Timing Games.

JEL Classification: D44; D81; D82; G13; G31; G32; L24

Suggested Citation

Cong, Lin, Auctions of Real Options (June 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2136359 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136359

Lin Cong (Contact Author)

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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