Setting the Agenda Setter

19 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2012

See all articles by Robert S. Erikson

Robert S. Erikson

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Yair Ghitza

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 30, 2012

Abstract

We simulate the results of tournaments in which legislators vie for the role of leader, who sets the legislative agenda to their liking. We show that with multiple dimensions, when all choices for leader are paired against each other, a Condorcet winner is more likely than not. The probability of a Condorcet winner (who defeats all comers in a leadership battle) actually increases with the complexity of the structure of legislative preferences.

Suggested Citation

Erikson, Robert S. and Ghitza, Yair, Setting the Agenda Setter (August 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137397 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2137397

Robert S. Erikson

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

MC3320
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212-854-0036 (Phone)

Yair Ghitza (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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