The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

9 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2012

See all articles by R. Emre Aytimur

R. Emre Aytimur

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Aristotelis Boukouras

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robert Schwager

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 31, 2012

Abstract

We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters’ ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.

Keywords: elections, polarization, strategic delegation, bureaucracy, foreign influence

JEL Classification: D720, D780, H110

Suggested Citation

Aytimur, R. Emre and Boukouras, Aristotelis and Schwager, Robert, The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control (July 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3900, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137538

R. Emre Aytimur

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, 37073
Germany

Aristotelis Boukouras

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Robert Schwager (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

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