36 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2012
Date Written: July 31, 2012
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.
Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections
JEL Classification: F530, F550, O190
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dreher, Axel and Gould, Matthew and Rablen, Matthew D. and Vreeland, James Raymond, The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council (July 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3902. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137541