The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council

36 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2012  

Axel Dreher

University of Heidelberg

Matthew Gould

University of Westminster

Matthew D. Rablen

Brunel University London - Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications

James Raymond Vreeland

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Government

Date Written: July 31, 2012

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections

JEL Classification: F530, F550, O190

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Gould, Matthew and Rablen, Matthew D. and Vreeland, James Raymond, The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council (July 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3902. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2137541

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

University of Heidelberg ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Matthew Gould

University of Westminster ( email )

309 Regent Street
London, W1R 8AL
United Kingdom

Matthew D. Rablen

Brunel University London - Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications ( email )

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

James Raymond Vreeland

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-7846 (Phone)
202-687-5116 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com/

Georgetown University - Department of Government

United States
202-687-7846 (Phone)
202-687-5116 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com/

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