The Allocation of Resources by Voting

Posted: 29 Aug 2012

See all articles by Yoram Barzel

Yoram Barzel

University of Washington

Tim R. Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Date Written: August 1, 1990

Abstract

A general theory of voting, which explains under what conditions voting will be chosen as a means for allocating resources and how the constitution that governs the voting will be structured is presented. It is hypothesized that developers of voting organizations will structure their organizations in order to maximize the value of shares sold by minimizing the expected costs of wealth transfer and decision making in the voting organization. Implications regarding the allocation of votes and assessments within the organization, the domain of voting decisions, and the optimal voting rule are tested with data on the constitutional structure of condominium homeowner associations.

Suggested Citation

Barzel, Yoram and Sass, Tim, The Allocation of Resources by Voting (August 1, 1990). Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, No. 3, 1990, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2138439

Yoram Barzel (Contact Author)

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353330
Seattle, WA 98195-3330
United States
206-543-2510 (Phone)
206-685-7477 (Fax)

Tim Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

Department of Economics
35 Broad Street, 6th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
404-413-0150 (Phone)
404-413-0145 (Fax)

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