Judicial Incentives and Performance at Lower Courts: Evidence from Slovenian Judge-Level Data

Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 215-252, 2012

Posted: 30 Aug 2012

See all articles by Valentina P. Dimitrova-Grajzl

Valentina P. Dimitrova-Grajzl

Virginia Military Institute

Peter Grajzl

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo

Janez Sustersic

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Katarina Zajc

University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 14, 2012

Abstract

Empirical studies of judicial behavior using judge-level data are scarce and almost exclusively focused on higher court judges in the U.S. The majority of disputes in any legal system, however, are adjudicated by lower court judges and conclusions about judicial behavior from one legal system cannot be generalized to other legal systems. This paper draws on unique judge-level data to study judicial performance at lower courts in Slovenia, a post-socialist member state of the European Union struggling with implementation of an effective judicial system. We first examine the determinants of judicial productivity and elucidate the role of a judge's demographic characteristics, education, experience, salary, promotion concerns, and case specialization. We then explore the possible tradeoff between the quantity and the quality of judicial case resolution, shedding light on the benefits and costs of those legal reform measures that aim to increase judicial productivity in Slovenian lower courts.

Keywords: Judicial productivity, judge-level data, quantity-quality tradeoff

JEL Classification: K40, K49, P37

Suggested Citation

Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina P. and Grajzl, Peter and Sustersic, Janez and Zajc, Katarina, Judicial Incentives and Performance at Lower Courts: Evidence from Slovenian Judge-Level Data (August 14, 2012). Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 215-252, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2138481

Valentina P. Dimitrova-Grajzl

Virginia Military Institute ( email )

Department of Economics and Business
Scott Shipp Hall
Lexington, VA 24450
United States

Peter Grajzl (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Janez Sustersic

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Katarina Zajc

University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Law ( email )

Dunajska 104
1000 Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
291
PlumX Metrics