Impatience, Incentives, and Obesity

Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-20

W. J. Usery Workplace Research Group Working Paper No. 2012-7-4

48 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2012

See all articles by Charles Courtemanche

Charles Courtemanche

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Garth Heutel

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics

Patrick McAlvanah

Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between time preferences, economic incentives, and body mass index (BMI). Using data from the 2006 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we first show that greater impatience increases BMI and the likelihood of obesity even after controlling for demographic, human capital, occupational, and financial characteristics as well as risk preference. Next, we provide evidence of an interaction effect between time preference and food prices, with cheaper food leading to the largest weight gains among those exhibiting the most impatience. The interaction of changing economic incentives with heterogeneous discounting may help explain why increases in BMI have been concentrated amongst the right tail of the distribution, where the health consequences are especially severe. Lastly, we model time-inconsistent preferences by computing individuals' quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters. Both long-run patience and present-bias predict BMI, suggesting obesity is partly attributable to rational intertemporal tradeoffs but also partly to time inconsistency.

Keywords: Obesity, body mass index, time inconsistency, hyperbolic discounting, present bias, discount factor, discount rate, time preference, food prices

JEL Classification: I10, D9

Suggested Citation

Courtemanche, Charles and Heutel, Garth and McAlvanah, Patrick, Impatience, Incentives, and Obesity (July 2012). Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-20, W. J. Usery Workplace Research Group Working Paper No. 2012-7-4, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139065

Charles Courtemanche (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-413-0082 (Phone)

Garth Heutel

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics ( email )

Greensboro, NC 27402-6165
United States

Patrick McAlvanah

Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Mail Drop HQ238
Washington, DC 20580
United States

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