The Theory of Clubs and Competitive Coalitions

Posted: 1 Sep 2012

See all articles by Myrna H. Wooders

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

This review discusses research demonstrating that club economies and coalition economies with many participants and relatively small effective groups (clubs, jurisdictions, or coalitions) are competitive. Small groups are effective if all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by cooperation restricted to them. At this point, there are many papers in the literature demonstrating the competitiveness of club and coalition economies in a variety of contexts. To facilitate the exposition, I treat economies with quasi-linear utilities and games with side payments. The main concepts and results for this framework are discussed. Additionally, relationships are established with regard to broader models of club and coalition economies, including very recent contributions to the literature.

Suggested Citation

Wooders, Myrna H., The Theory of Clubs and Competitive Coalitions (July 2012). Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 595-626, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139259 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111006

Myrna H. Wooders (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

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