Legal Entrepreneurship within a System of Entangled Political Economy

15 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2012 Last revised: 25 Aug 2018

Shruti Rajagopalan

Department of Economics, SUNY Purchase College; Classical Liberal Institute, NYU School of Law

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 31, 2012

Abstract

Entrepreneurship is the economic source of change in society. While it is ubiquitous, its particular qualities depend on the system of political economy in which it operates. We distinguish between two systems of democratic political economy. One system is the classically liberal system where economic entities interact within the market while political entities do little more than maintain the legal framework necessary for the market order. This system of political economy entails clear distinction between the realms of market and political action. The alternative system is an entangled political economy, where the distinction between realms is obscured due to interaction among market and political entities. While entrepreneurship operates in both systems, the substantive properties of entrepreneurship will differ between the two systems, as this paper explores within the particular context of legal entrepreneurship.

Keywords: entrepreneurship; legal framework; constitutional political economy; ORDO liberalism; common law efficiency; entangled political economy.

JEL Classification: D72, K40, P16, P51

Suggested Citation

Rajagopalan, Shruti and Wagner, Richard E., Legal Entrepreneurship within a System of Entangled Political Economy (August 31, 2012). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 12-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139397 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139397

Shruti Rajagopalan

Department of Economics, SUNY Purchase College ( email )

735 Anderson Hill Road
Purchase, NY 10577
United States

Classical Liberal Institute, NYU School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

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