Are Sequential Trials Really Better than Unitary Trials?

34 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2012

See all articles by Jef P. B. De Mot

Jef P. B. De Mot

Ghent University

Barbara Luppi

University of St. Thomas School of Law; Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Date Written: August 31, 2012

Abstract

In a dispute involving multifarious points of disagreement, courts have the discretion to adjudicate issues separately in multiple, sequential proceedings or all-at-once in a single unitary proceeding. In this paper, we contrast the effects of sequential and unitary trials on parties’ decisions to litigate and parties’ expenditures in litigation, using a rent-seeking model. Contrary to the prior literature on this topic, we find that neither procedural regime is outright superior to the other and that the optimal choice of procedural regime is contingent on factors particular to each case. Furthermore, we identify which conditions cause one procedural regime to be more efficient than the other, and suggest policies to take advantage of these differences.

Keywords: rent-seeking, litigation expenditures, sequential litigation

JEL Classification: B31, D72, K10, K12, K13, K41

Suggested Citation

De Mot, Jef P. B. and Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Are Sequential Trials Really Better than Unitary Trials? (August 31, 2012). U of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-23; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139787

Jef P. B. De Mot

Ghent University ( email )

Universiteitsstraat 4
Ghent, 9000
Belgium

Barbara Luppi (Contact Author)

University of St. Thomas School of Law

2115 Summit Avenue
Saint Paul, MN 55105
United States

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
1,047
rank
286,306
PlumX Metrics