Public Housing Units vs. Housing Vouchers: Accessibility, Local Public Goods, and Welfare

39 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2012

See all articles by Charles K. Leung

Charles K. Leung

City University of Hong Kong

Sinan Sarpca

Koc University - Department of Economics

Kuzey Yilmaz

University of Rochester - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 4, 2012

Abstract

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.

Keywords: housing policy, welfare, residential location choice, local public goods, endogenous sorting

JEL Classification: H40, D60, H82, R13

Suggested Citation

Leung, Charles Ka Yui and Sarpca, Sinan and Yilmaz, Kuzey, Public Housing Units vs. Housing Vouchers: Accessibility, Local Public Goods, and Welfare (September 4, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2141225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141225

Charles Ka Yui Leung (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

Sinan Sarpca

Koc University - Department of Economics ( email )

Rumeli Feneri Yolu
Sariyer 80910, Istanbul
Turkey
+90 (212) 338 1214 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://network.ku.edu.tr/~ssarpca/

Kuzey Yilmaz

University of Rochester - Department of Economics ( email )

Harkness Hall
Rochester, NY 14627
United States

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