Consequences of the Revolving Door: Evaluating the Lobbying Success of Former Congressional Members and Staff

19 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2012

See all articles by Jeffrey Lazarus

Jeffrey Lazarus

Georgia State University - Department of Political Science

Amy Melissa McKay

University of Exeter

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

Both government watchdog groups and government itself have shown concern about the “revolving door” of employees from Congress to private lobbying organizations and the reverse. But virtually no one has analyzed whether this fear is justified. We take steps to fill this gap in the literature by creating a dataset that links individual lobbyists, and whether they formerly worked on Capitol Hill, to their lobbying success. Looking at all American colleges and universities as our universe, we identify (a) those who lobbied, (b) within this group, those who hired so-called “revolvers” as lobbyists, and (c) the amount of money each recieved in congressional funding. We test not only whether schools that lobby recieve more funding than schools that do not, but also whether universities that hired a revolver receive more funding than those who lobby, but do not hire a revolver. We find evidence for both propositions, and conclude that Congress and others are right to question whether revolving-door lobbyists have disproportionate success, and whether they should be regulated more heavily.

Keywords: lobbying, lobbyists, revolving door, colleges and universities, lobbying success, Congressional earmarks

Suggested Citation

Lazarus, Jeffrey and McKay, Amy Melissa, Consequences of the Revolving Door: Evaluating the Lobbying Success of Former Congressional Members and Staff (2012). A paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2141416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141416

Jeffrey Lazarus

Georgia State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30302
United States

Amy Melissa McKay (Contact Author)

University of Exeter ( email )

Northcote House
The Queen's Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4QJ
United Kingdom

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