Portfolio Size and Information Disclosure: An Analysis of Startup Accelerators
33 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2012 Last revised: 19 Mar 2015
Date Written: October 16, 2014
We study the information-gathering role of a startup accelerator and consider the accelerator’s incentives to choose a portfolio size and disclose information about participating ventures. We show that in a rational-expectations equilibrium, the resultant portfolio size is smaller than the first-best (efficient) level, consistent with some real-world observations. We further show that when some signals are uninformative and the portfolio consists of mostly high-quality ventures, the accelerator may choose to disclose only positive signals (and conceal negative signals) about its portfolio firms — a strategy we refer to as partial disclosure. Moreover, coupled with pursuing this strategy of partial disclosure, we demonstrate that the accelerator may possess incentives to exit its portfolio firms early.
Keywords: Startup accelerators, early-stage financing, portfolio size, information disclosure.
JEL Classification: D82, G24, G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation