The New Financial Stability Mechanisms and Their (Poor) Consistency with EU Law

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) Working Paper No. 2012/44

24 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2012

See all articles by Giuseppe Bianco

Giuseppe Bianco

University of Oslo; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Date Written: August 2012

Abstract

This working paper examines the institutional reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The response has so far consisted of three new financial mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the European Stability Mechanism. These have each a different legal basis and a specific regime. They display a varying degree of compatibility with EU law.

The institutional quick fix employed by Eurozone countries was essentially a resort to private law and traditional international law techniques. This constitutes a setback from the evolution of the EU, at the expense mainly of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.

Keywords: European sovereign debt crisis, European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, European Financial Stability Facility, European Stability Mechanism, no-bailout clause

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Bianco, Giuseppe, The New Financial Stability Mechanisms and Their (Poor) Consistency with EU Law (August 2012). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) Working Paper No. 2012/44, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2143249 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2143249

Giuseppe Bianco (Contact Author)

University of Oslo ( email )

Karl Johansgate 47
Oslo, 0162
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://www.jus.uio.no/?vrtx=person-view&uid=guiseppb&lang=en

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12 Place du Panthéon
Paris, 75005
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
201
Abstract Views
783
Rank
284,157
PlumX Metrics