The Impact of Democracy and Press Freedom on Corruption: Conditionality Matters

24 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2012

See all articles by Christine Kalenborn

Christine Kalenborn

Dresden University of Technology - Institute for Transport and Economics

Christian Lessmann

Technology University of Braunschweig; Ifo Branch Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: August 31, 2012

Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes the joint impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption. Based in the theoretical literature, we argue that both institutional features are complements rather than substitutes in controlling corruption. Our regressions are based on a cross section of 170 countries covering the period from 2005 to 2010 as well as on panel evidence for 175 countries from 1996 to 2010. The results show that democratic elections only work in controlling corruption, if there is a certain degree of press freedom in a country, vice versa. Our policy implication is that democratic reforms are more effective if they are accompanied by institutional reforms strengthening the monitoring of politicians.

Keywords: democracy, corruption, press freedom, interaction effects

JEL Classification: C210, D730, O500

Suggested Citation

Kalenborn, Christine and Lessmann, Christian, The Impact of Democracy and Press Freedom on Corruption: Conditionality Matters (August 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3917. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144137

Christine Kalenborn

Dresden University of Technology - Institute for Transport and Economics ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
D-01062 Dresden
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/vkw/iwv/vwl/index_html/document_view?set_language=en

Christian Lessmann (Contact Author)

Technology University of Braunschweig ( email )

Abt-Jerusalem-Str. 7
Braunschweig, D-38106
Germany

Ifo Branch Dresden ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

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