Spillover Effect of Fraud Allegations and Investor Sentiment

49 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2012 Last revised: 1 Jul 2017

See all articles by Masako N. Darrough

Masako N. Darrough

City University of New York - Baruch College - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy

Rong Huang

City University of New York (CUNY) - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy

Sha Zhao

School of Business Administration, Oakland University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 30, 2016

Abstract

We examine whether a stock price spillover effect spreads through the method of listing or country of origin and whether this spillover effect changes when investor sentiment shifts. Using a sample of fraud allegations against Chinese companies that became public through reverse mergers (CRMs), we first investigate whether firms suffering from negative stock price spillover effects are those with the same method of listing or from the same country as firms that have been accused of fraud. We find that the stock price spillover effect spreads through the firm’s country of origin only after investor sentiment about Chinese companies worsens significantly, as evinced by significant declines in the stock prices of non-fraudulent Chinese companies, including both CRMs and Chinese IPOs. Second, we find that the intensity of the stock price spillover effect increases with short-selling activities. Our findings indicate that: 1) investor sentiment plays a significant role in the spillover process involving fraud allegations; and 2) the country of origin appears to be the primary while the method of listings appears to be the secondary mechanism of the negative spillover effect when both the country and RM spillover effects exist.

Keywords: Spillover Effect, Investor Sentiment, Fraud, Reverse Mergers

JEL Classification: G14, M41

Suggested Citation

Darrough, Masako N. and Huang, Rong and Zhao, Sha, Spillover Effect of Fraud Allegations and Investor Sentiment (January 30, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144483 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144483

Masako N. Darrough

City University of New York - Baruch College - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
New York, NY 10010
United States
646 312 3183 (Phone)
646 312 3161 (Fax)

Rong Huang (Contact Author)

City University of New York (CUNY) - Stan Ross Department of Accountancy ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way, Box B12-225
New York, NY 10010
United States
(646)312-3204 (Phone)

Sha Zhao

School of Business Administration, Oakland University

439A Elliott Hall
2200 N. Squirrel Road
Rochester, MI Michigan 48309
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
997
Abstract Views
5,589
rank
13,247
PlumX Metrics