Access to Management and the Informativeness of Analyst Research

46 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2012 Last revised: 10 Sep 2015

T. Clifton Green

Emory University - Goizueta Business School

Russell Jame

University of Kentucky

Stanimir Markov

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Edwin L. Cox School of Business

Musa Subasi

University of Maryland-College Park - Robert H. Smith School of Business

Date Written: January 17, 2014

Abstract

We examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative research by analysts. We find analyst recommendation changes have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst’s firm has a conference-hosting relationship with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, accurate, and timely earnings forecasts than non-hosts. Our findings suggest that access to management remains an important source of analysts’ informational advantage in the post- Regulation Fair Disclosure world.

Keywords: Analyst Recommendations, Earnings Forecasts, Selective Disclosure, Conference Presentations

JEL Classification: G14

Suggested Citation

Green, T. Clifton and Jame, Russell and Markov, Stanimir and Subasi, Musa, Access to Management and the Informativeness of Analyst Research (January 17, 2014). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), 114 (2014) 249-255. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144543

T. Clifton Green (Contact Author)

Emory University - Goizueta Business School ( email )

1300 Clifton Rd.
Atlanta, GA 30322-2710
United States
404-727-5167 (Phone)
404-727-5238 (Fax)

Russell Jame

University of Kentucky ( email )

Gatton College of Businesss & Economics
Lexington, KY 40506
United States

HOME PAGE: http://russelljame.com

Stanimir Markov

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Edwin L. Cox School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 750333
Dallas, TX 75275-0333
United States

Musa Subasi

University of Maryland-College Park - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )

University of Maryland-College Park
4332N Van Munching Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-314-1055 (Phone)

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