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Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting

Holger Spamann

Harvard Law School

October 2014

Harvard Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 730

This paper exposits a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and derivatives (TRS, CDS) in which a large trader can sometimes profitably acquire securities with their corporate control rights for the sole purpose of reducing the corporation's value and gaining on a net short position created through off-setting derivatives. At other times, the large trader profitably takes a net long position. The large trader requires no private information beyond its own trades. The problem is most likely to manifest when derivatives trade on an exchange and transactions give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

JEL Classification: G34, K22

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Date posted: September 11, 2012 ; Last revised: October 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Spamann, Holger, Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting (October 2014). Harvard Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 730. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144552 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144552

Contact Information

Holger Spamann (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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