The Effect of Motivations on Social Indirect Reciprocity: An Experimental Analysis

Posted: 12 Sep 2012

See all articles by Luca Stanca

Luca Stanca

University of Milan, Bicocca - Department of Economics; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Luigino Bruni

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Marco Mantovani

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS); Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis à Bruxelles - CEREC

Date Written: August 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of motivations on the perceived kindness of an action within the context of strong social indirect reciprocity. We test experimentally the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome, an action is perceived by a third party to be less kind if it can be strategically motivated. The results do not support this hypothesis: social indirect reciprocity is indeed found to be significantly stronger when strategic motivations cannot be ruled out. We interpret these findings as an indication of the role played by team reasoning in explaining reciprocal behavior.

Keywords: Indirect Reciprocity, Motivations, Social Preferences, Laboratory Experiments

JEL Classification: D63, C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Stanca, Luca and Bruni, Luigino and Mantovani, Marco, The Effect of Motivations on Social Indirect Reciprocity: An Experimental Analysis (August 1, 2009). Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 18, No. 17, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144764

Luca Stanca

University of Milan, Bicocca - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo, Nuovo I
Milan 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Luigino Bruni

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Marco Mantovani (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis à Bruxelles - CEREC ( email )

Brussels, 1000
Belgium
+32 2 7923551 (Phone)

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