Who Cares About Equity? A Social Norm Revisited

54 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2012 Last revised: 6 Jun 2013

See all articles by Bernhard Kittel

Bernhard Kittel

University of Vienna Department of Economic Sociology

Fabian Paetzel

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universit├Ąt; DFG Research Group 2104

Stefan Traub

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Department of Economics; University of the German Federal Armed Forces - DFG Research Group 2104

Date Written: June 5, 2013

Abstract

We introduce a three-person redistribution game with preplay communication. Three focal points of the game are derived from different equity standards and Rawls' difference principle. An experimental test confirms our hypothesis that equity in terms of effort-proportionality is not pursued at the group level. Only a large 'middle class' and/or institutional hurdles that limit the power of the less productive prevent highly productive players from being expropriated.

Keywords: Equity, Voting, Redistribution, Cheap Talk, Real Effort Experiment

JEL Classification: D72, D63, C92

Suggested Citation

Kittel, Bernhard and Paetzel, Fabian and Traub, Stefan, Who Cares About Equity? A Social Norm Revisited (June 5, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2145388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2145388

Bernhard Kittel

University of Vienna Department of Economic Sociology ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, 1090
Austria

Fabian Paetzel (Contact Author)

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universit├Ąt ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, 22008
Germany

DFG Research Group 2104 ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, DE 22043
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/en?set_language=en

Stefan Traub

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Department of Economics ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, 22043
Germany

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - DFG Research Group 2104 ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hmaburg, DE 22043
Germany

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