Burdens of Proof

47 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2012 Last revised: 29 Apr 2014

Date Written: June 10, 2013


The conceptual foundations of burdens of proof are examined, and the unified theory of evidentiary devices derivable from those foundations is explicated. Both the conceptual foundations and the unified theory generated are shown to rest on questionable assumptions about conventional probability theory. The resulting analytical difficulties are analyzed. Inference to the best explanation and the relative plausibility theory are examined as potentially providing the foundation to a superior conceptualization of the burden of proof.

Keywords: evidence, epsteimology, burdens of proof, persuasion, production, trials, probability theory, inference to the best explanation, relative plausibility

Suggested Citation

Allen, Ronald Jay, Burdens of Proof (June 10, 2013). Journal of Law, Probability and Risk, Forthcoming; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper 12-17; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper 12-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2146184

Ronald Jay Allen (Contact Author)

Northwestern University Law School ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-8372 (Phone)
312-503-2035 (Fax)

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