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Markets Can Cure Spam Zombies

2 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2012  

Marshall W. Van Alstyne

Boston University – Questrom School of Business; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School

Sarah Zatko

Boston University - Department of Computer Science

Date Written: September 2009

Abstract

Using attention bonds to create attention markets has been proposed as a solution to the spam problem. One critique leveled at this approach is that criminals might then try to seize the bonds and not just CPU cycles. We propose a simple solution based on insurance and two sided networks in order to show that markets can address this critique.

Keywords: spam, zombies, attention bonds, Coase, two sided markets, insurance

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30

Suggested Citation

Van Alstyne, Marshall W. and Zatko, Sarah, Markets Can Cure Spam Zombies (September 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2148741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148741

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author)

Boston University – Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://questromapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/Profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School ( email )

Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html

Sarah Zatko

Boston University - Department of Computer Science ( email )

Boston, MA
United States

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