Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-033A

31 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2012

See all articles by David K. Levine

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Salvatore Modica

Universita di Palermo

Federico Weinschelbaum

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella - Departamento de Economia; CONICET

Felipe Zurita

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Date Written: September 18, 2011

Abstract

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.

Keywords: Impatience trap, evolutionary preference, efficiency

JEL Classification: D01 D03

Suggested Citation

Levine, David K. and Modica, Salvatore and Weinschelbaum, Federico and Zurita, Felipe, Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (September 18, 2011). FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-033A. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2149144

David K. Levine (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Salvatore Modica

Universita di Palermo ( email )

IMRO
I-98121 Palermo
Italy
(091) 6626 232 (Phone)
(091) 42 67 81 (Fax)

Federico Weinschelbaum

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella - Departamento de Economia ( email )

Minones 2177
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
541151697183 (Phone)

CONICET ( email )

Buenos Aires, C1425FQB
Argentina

Felipe Zurita

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ( email )

Av Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins 340
Santiago, Región Metropolitana 8331150
Chile
+56-2-2354 4318 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uc.cl

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
26
Abstract Views
445
PlumX Metrics