Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149583
 


 



The Role of Bargaining Style in Public Company Audits


Heather M. Hermanson


Michael J. Coles College of Business

Kurt S. Schulzke


Kennesaw State University

G. Richard Shell


affiliation not provided to SSRN

2003

Journal of Forensic Accounting 1524-5586/Vol.IV (2003), pp. 233-248

Abstract:     
Prior auditing research has found that negotiation plays an important role in audit outcomes. General purpose negotiating literature suggests that bargaining styles are an important factor in business negotiations and that bargaining style mismatches between negotiating counterparties can influence negotiation results. To date, the role of auditors’ bargaining-style tendencies in audit negotiations has gone unnoticed in the auditing literature. This study examines the bargaining styles of accountants and managers as measured by the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI). The results suggest that accountants are predisposed to avoid conflict or accommodate whereas managers are predisposed to collaborate or compete. Recognizing this potential mismatch of bargaining styles should help the auditor to develop more effective negotiation strategies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: bargaining style, negotiation, auditing, TKI

JEL Classification: M41, K22


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Date posted: September 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Hermanson, Heather M. and Schulzke, Kurt S. and Shell, G. Richard, The Role of Bargaining Style in Public Company Audits (2003). Journal of Forensic Accounting 1524-5586/Vol.IV (2003), pp. 233-248. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149583

Contact Information

Heather M. Hermanson
Michael J. Coles College of Business ( email )
1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States
Kurt S. Schulzke (Contact Author)
Kennesaw State University ( email )
1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States
+1470-578-6379 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://schulzkelaw.com/
G. Richard Shell
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN


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