32 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2012 Last revised: 30 Oct 2012
Date Written: June 21, 2012
Asymmetric information is an important phenomenon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is crucial to test for asymmetric information in specific insurance markets.
In this paper, we analyse a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric information depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006), we also test whether drivers have realistic expectations concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, automobile insurance, parametric tests, imperfect competition
JEL Classification: D82, C12, G22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Spindler, Martin and Winter, Joachim K. and Hagmayer, Steffen, Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automotive Insurance: Evidence from Germany (June 21, 2012). MEA Discussion Paper No. 259-2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150044