Mixed Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms

14 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2012

See all articles by Claudio Mezzetti

Claudio Mezzetti

University of Warwick - Faculty of Social Studies

Ludovic Renou

Queen Mary University of London

Date Written: September 2012

Abstract

This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adoptfinite mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-D inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed Nash implementation with finite mechanisms in separable environments. Top-D inclusiveness is an efficiency condition.

Keywords: Implementation, Maskin monotonicity, pure and mixed Nash equilibrium, set-monotonicity, social choice correspondence, finite mechanisms

JEL Classification: C72, D71

Suggested Citation

Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic, Mixed Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms (September 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150169

Claudio Mezzetti

University of Warwick - Faculty of Social Studies ( email )

United Kingdom

Ludovic Renou (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

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