Private Legal Transplant: Multinational Enterprises as Proxies of Legal Homogenization

60 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2012 Last revised: 3 Jul 2013

See all articles by Tomaso Ferrando

Tomaso Ferrando

University of Antwerp Law and Development Research Group and Institute of Policy Development

Date Written: June 23, 2013

Abstract

The last decades have been characterized by a surge in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the expansion of Global Production Networks as a new model of production. However, while hundreds of studies have been produced, little attention has been paid to the legal transformations that is taking place whenever a transnational enterprises (TNEs) physically or contractually occupies space within national legal orders. In this chapter, I expand the scope of the traditional theory of legal transplant to look at FDIs and Codes of Conduct, and conclude that they create Special Legal Zones (SLZ), separated sub-regimes where TNEs exercise their de-facto jurisdiction. Thus, looking at the micro-mechanisms of legal reproduction we discover the limitedness of traditional theories of legal transplant. and that, while critics of legal transplant stand in front of their houses to fight against the hegemony of legal and cultural homogenization, their enemy is entering from the back yard.

Keywords: Legal Transplant, Multinational Enterprises, Globalization, Foreign Direct Investments, Codes of Conduct, CSR

Suggested Citation

Ferrando, Tomaso, Private Legal Transplant: Multinational Enterprises as Proxies of Legal Homogenization (June 23, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2152861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2152861

Tomaso Ferrando (Contact Author)

University of Antwerp Law and Development Research Group and Institute of Policy Development ( email )

Venusstraat 23
Antwerp, 2000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/tomaso-ferrando/

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