Do Public Health Interventions Crowd Out Private Health Investments? Malaria Control Policies in Eritrea

118 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2012

See all articles by Pedro Manuel Carneiro

Pedro Manuel Carneiro

University College London - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Tewolde Ghebremeskel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Joseph Keating

Tulane University - School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine

Andrea Locatelli

Bank of Italy - Research Department

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2012

Abstract

It is often argued that engaging in indoor residual spraying (IRS) in areas with high coverage of mosquito bed nets may discourage net ownership and use. This is just a case of a public program inducing perverse incentives. We analyze new data from a randomized control trial conducted in Eritrea which surprisingly shows the opposite: IRS encouraged net acquisition and use. Our evidence points to the role of imperfect information. The introduction of IRS may have made the problem of malaria more salient, leading to a change in beliefs about its importance and to an increase in private health investments.

Keywords: Crowding-Out, Development, Health, Malaria

JEL Classification: I10

Suggested Citation

Carneiro, Pedro Manuel and Ghebremeskel, Tewolde and Keating, Joseph and Locatelli, Andrea, Do Public Health Interventions Crowd Out Private Health Investments? Malaria Control Policies in Eritrea (May 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8976, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153408

Pedro Manuel Carneiro (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tewolde Ghebremeskel

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Joseph Keating

Tulane University - School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine

New Orleans, LA 70112
United States

Andrea Locatelli

Bank of Italy - Research Department ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy

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