Higher Bars for Incumbents and Experience

31 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2012

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Markus Muller

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC)

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When campaigning for election to an open seat in the first period, candidates can make binding offers of the minimum share of the votes they must obtain to be re-elected in the second period, should they win in the first. We prove that, in equilibrium, both candidates offer the same vote-share threshold, that it exceeds 50 percent, and that it is socially optimal. The higher threshold increases the expected effort over both periods and tends to raise the expected level of ability of office-holders in the second. Together, these effects outweigh the expected loss of incumbents' acquired experience, which results from their reduced chances of getting re-elected with the higher bar. The socially optimal vote threshold is increasing in the value of experience. All of the above conclusions would hold if the optimal threshold were set instead by law.

Keywords: elections, experience, incumbency advantage, political contracts, vote-share thresholds

JEL Classification: D7, D82, H4

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Muller, Markus, Higher Bars for Incumbents and Experience (June 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153437

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Research ( email )

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Zurich, 8092
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+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Markus Muller

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC) ( email )

ETH-Zentrum
Zurich, CH-8092

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