Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia

70 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2012

See all articles by Stefano DellaVigna

Stefano DellaVigna

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ruben Enikolopov

Institute of Political Economy and Governance; New Economic School; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona GSE

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA); Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); New Economic School (NES)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

Which factors stand in the way of cooperation between countries formerly at war? We examine the role of nationalistic content of a media outlet reaching citizens of a neighboring country. We consider radio signals travelling across borders in the region that witnessed one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since WWII: the Serbo-Croatian conflict in the Yugoslavian wars. Using survey and election data, we show that, after a decade since the end of the war, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers animosity towards Serbs in Croatia, potentially endangering peace. In particular, we find that a large fraction of Croats listen to Serbian radio (intended for Serbian listeners across the border) whenever signal is available. The residents of Croatian villages with good-quality signal of Serbian public radio are more likely to vote for extreme nationalist parties. In addition, ethnically offensive graffiti are more common in villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes an increase in anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats.

Keywords: media, nationalism

JEL Classification: O10

Suggested Citation

DellaVigna, Stefano and Enikolopov, Ruben and Petrova, Maria and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia (July 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9042. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153473

Stefano DellaVigna (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Economics Department
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-643-0715 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/sdellavi/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ruben Enikolopov

Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

New Economic School ( email )

Skolkovskoe shosse 45
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

ICREA ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Maria Petrova

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA) ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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