Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Adjudication Equilibria (Revised)

52 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2012 Last revised: 12 Oct 2012

See all articles by Charles M. Cameron

Charles M. Cameron

Princeton University - Department of Political Science; Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Lewis A. Kornhauser

New York University School of Law

Date Written: September 26, 2010

Abstract

We present a formal game theoretic model of adjudication by a collegial court. The model incorporates dispute resolution as well as judicial policy making and indicates the relationship between the two. It explicitly addresses joins, concurrences and dissents, and assumes "judicial" rather than legislative or electoral objectives by the actors. The model makes clear and often novel predictions about the plurality opinion's location in "policy" space; the case's disposition; and the size and composition of the disposition-, join-, and concurrence-coalitions. These elements of adjudication equilibrium vary with the identity of the opinion writer and with the location of the case. In general, the opinion is not located at the ideal policy of the median judge. The model suggests new departures for empirical work on judicial politics.

This paper substantially revises a prior version dated July 1 2009.

Keywords: collegial courts

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D79, K40

Suggested Citation

Cameron, Charles M. and Kornhauser, Lewis A., Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Adjudication Equilibria (Revised) (September 26, 2010). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-52; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153785

Charles M. Cameron

Princeton University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
United States

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Lewis A. Kornhauser (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
(212) 998-6175 (Phone)
(212) 995-4341 (Fax)

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