A Clash of Regulatory Paradigms

8 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2012  

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science

Date Written: October 1, 2012

Abstract

The decision whether to mandate access to telecommunications networks presents policymakers with a choice between two regulatory paradigms. One focuses on breaking down the traditional monopoly by stimulating competitive entry; the other surrenders to the monopoly and simply seeks to allocate the monopoly facility. The theoretical and empirical literature both suggest that whenever competition is feasible, policymakers should generally follow the first course by refusing to mandate access. Moreover, when competition is feasible but not yet present, policymakers should mandate access only if the short-run static efficiency losses from monopoly dominate the long-run dynamic efficiency gains.

Suggested Citation

Yoo, Christopher S., A Clash of Regulatory Paradigms (October 1, 2012). Regulation, p. 42, Fall 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2155055

Christopher S. Yoo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/

University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication ( email )

3620 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science ( email )

3330 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6309
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

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