Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball

57 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2012)

35 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2012 Last revised: 15 Mar 2013

Garrett Broshuis

Saint Louis University - School of Law

Date Written: April 5, 2012

Abstract

Highly talented baseball players, as scarce commodities, command large sums of money in the form of signing bonuses prior to ever playing a professional baseball game. Yet the development of these highly talented baseball players is risky business. This Article demonstrates the utility of clawbacks in deterring possible opportunistic behavior amongst highly talented baseball players. Ultimately, the lessons learned from such deterrents can be applied to other areas ripe for opportunism such as executive compensation.

Keywords: Baseball, minor leagues, executive compensation, clawbacks, Dodd-Frank, opportunism

Suggested Citation

Broshuis, Garrett, Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball (April 5, 2012). 57 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2157667

Garrett Broshuis (Contact Author)

Saint Louis University - School of Law ( email )

100 N. Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63101
United States

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