Public Choice Theory Dan Aplikasinya Dalam Sistem Legislasi Indonesia (Public Choice Theory and its Application in Indonesian Legislation System)

24 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2012 Last revised: 8 Nov 2014

See all articles by Pramudya A. Oktavinanda

Pramudya A. Oktavinanda

University of Chicago, Law School, Students

Date Written: October 8, 2012

Abstract

Indonesian Abstract: Artikel ini (yang dipresentasikan di Konferensi Negara Hukum 2012) memperkenalkan beberapa konsep dasar dari teori Publikc Choice, khususnya terkait Rasionalitas Aktor Politik, Paradoks Voting, dan Rent-Seeking-Grup Kepentingan.

Artikel ini ditujukan untuk memberikan gambaran umum dari berbagai konsep di atas dengan penjelasan mengenai aplikasinya dalam konteks Indonesia, khususnya untuk memahami perilaku legislator dalam membuat keputusan politik, termasuk menerbitkan undang-undang dan regulasi baru

English Abstract: This paper (which were presented in the 2012 Indonesian National Legal Conference on Rule of Law) introduces some of the basic concepts of Public Choice Theory, particularly Rationality of Political Actors, Voting Paradox and Rent Seeking-Interest Group, to Indonesian readers.

The paper is intended to provide a general overview of the above concepts with explanation of their application in Indonesian context, mainly in understanding legislative behavior in making political decisions, including passing new laws and regulations.

Note: Downloadable document is in Indonesian.

Keywords: public choice, law and economics, legislation process, regulation

JEL Classification: K20, K40

Suggested Citation

Oktavinanda, Pramudya A., Public Choice Theory Dan Aplikasinya Dalam Sistem Legislasi Indonesia (Public Choice Theory and its Application in Indonesian Legislation System) (October 8, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2158542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2158542

Pramudya A. Oktavinanda (Contact Author)

University of Chicago, Law School, Students ( email )

Chicago, IL
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
908
rank
23,020
Abstract Views
4,317
PlumX