57 Pages Posted: 9 Oct 2012 Last revised: 22 May 2013
Date Written: October 9, 2012
Rational choice theory is the dominant paradigm through which scholars of international law and international relations approach treaty design. In this Article, I challenge this paradigm using a combination of empirical observations of state behavior and theoretical insights from behavioral economics. I focus on one aspect of multilateral treaty design: namely, treaty reservations and associated legal mechanisms which allow states to vary the degree of their formal commitments to treaties. I call these mechanisms “treaty options”. I argue that framing matters powerfully for treaty options – and does so in ways inconsistent with rational choice theory but consistent with insights from behavioral economics. This finding has important implications for the theory, law, and practice of treaty-making and for our understandings of state behavior more generally.
Keywords: international law, treaties, reservations
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Galbraith, Jean, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design (October 9, 2012). Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, p. 309 (2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2159244