Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Effective and Necessary: Individual Supplier Behavior in Revenue Sharing and Wholesale Contracts

19 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2012 Last revised: 12 Feb 2016

Julie Niederhoff

Syracuse University

Panos Kouvelis

Washington University

Date Written: Feburary 10, 2016


We consider under what conditions a revenue sharing contract is most effective at improving system efficiency relative to a simple wholesale price contract. Using a behavioral laboratory approach, we investigate how a supplier's individual differences in risk aversion and fairness concerns influence how they set the pricing parameter(s) of a contract. We find that risk-neutral self-interested suppliers were able to improve the system and their own profits significantly under revenue sharing compared to wholesale pricing. However, individual behavioral factors of risk aversion or fairness preferences often made the more complicated revenue sharing contract either ineffective or unnecessary. Specifically, given a fairness-minded supplier, the simple wholesale price contract is comparably efficient to the revenue sharing contract set by a risk-neutral supplier and we find the coordinating contract is unnecessary. Conversely, given a strongly risk-averse supplier with no concerns for fairness a revenue sharing contract is ineffective in overcoming double marginalization.

Keywords: supply chain coordination, behavioral operations, behavior, wholesale, revenue sharing, experimental

Suggested Citation

Niederhoff, Julie and Kouvelis, Panos, Effective and Necessary: Individual Supplier Behavior in Revenue Sharing and Wholesale Contracts (Feburary 10, 2016). Available at SSRN: or

Julie Niederhoff (Contact Author)

Syracuse University ( email )

721 University Ave
WSOM 630
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States

Panos Kouvelis

Washington University ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Paper statistics

Abstract Views