50 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2012 Last revised: 27 Mar 2013
Date Written: February 1, 2013
The CFPB’s recently released “qualified mortgage” rules effectively discourage predatory lending but miss an equally important source of systemic risk: low-equity clustering. Specific “volatility inducing” mortgage terms when present in a substantial cluster of mortgage contracts exacerbate macroeconomic risk by increasing the chance that the housing and lending markets will have to absorb a wave of simultaneous defaults after a downturn in housing prices. We show that these terms became prevalent in a substantial proportion of residential mortgages in the years leading up to the home mortgage crisis. In contrast, during the earlier “amortization era” (when mortgagors were more likely to borrow at different times, with more substantial down payments, and more continual rates of amortization, without a need to refinance), an equally sized negative shock to housing prices would likely produce less negative equity, to a smaller set of borrowers. Instead of prohibiting the volatility-inducing terms, we propose three policies to better assure a greater diversification in the distribution of equity: (a) a modified home-mortgage interest deduction; (b) a modified “qualified residential mortgages” standard; and most importantly, (c) direct macroprudential regulation through a “cap-and-trade” system of leverage licenses and instituting varying degrees of “conforming mortgages” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Limiting the simultaneous clustering of negative equity mortgages can reproduce the structural advantages that were a natural byproduct of the amortization era where inevitable downturns, which disparately impacted homeowners with different levels of equity, could more easily be absorbed by the market.
Keywords: mortgage, equity, distribution, regulation, Dodd-Frank, leverage, licensing
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ayres, Ian and Mitts, Joshua, Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution of Home Equity (February 1, 2013). Yale Journal on Regulation, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2161545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2161545