Relaxing Constraints as a Conservation Policy

33 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2012

See all articles by Ben Groom

Ben Groom

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Charles Palmer

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: October 15, 2012

Abstract

Eco-entrepreneurs in developing countries are often subject to market or institutional constraints, e.g. via credit rationing or missing markets. Conservation interventions which relax constraints may be both cost-effective and poverty reducing. A simulation using data from an intervention in Madagascar to relax the technological constraints of forest honey production investigates this possibility. Cost-effectively achieving dual environment-development goals is shown to depend on the severity of constraints, relative prices and, importantly, the nature of technology. Success is more likely for technologies exhibiting close to constant returns to scale or high input complementarity. Forest honey does not meet these requirements, whereas sustainable forest management may well do. Ultimately, where market or institutional constraints are present, knowledge of the recipient technology is required for more informed, efficient and perhaps, more politically-acceptable conservation policy.

Keywords: payments for environmental services (PES), market constraints, cost-effectiveness, efficiency

JEL Classification: H21, Q28

Suggested Citation

Groom, Ben and Palmer, Charles, Relaxing Constraints as a Conservation Policy (October 15, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 63.2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2161807 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2161807

Ben Groom (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Charles Palmer

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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