Some Limits to the Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Grumbler's View on Harm and Damages in Hardcore Price Cartel Cases

Global Competition Litigation Review, Issue 4, 2010

9 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2012

See all articles by Thomas Eger

Thomas Eger

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

Peter Weise

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the concepts of harm and damages as they are used in tort law pose some serious conceptual problems in the area of antitrust law. Consequently, there are some limits to the private enforcement of antitrust law via damages actions that have to be taken into account when considering to what extent private damages actions should be facilitated. The focus here is on the case of a hardcore price cartel.

Specific features of harm and damages in antitrust law are discussed in the next section. Thereafter, a simple numerical example is used to show that the recent discussion on harm caused by price cartels systematically neglects some important feedback effects and produces a biased assessment of the harm suffered by different groups of victims.

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Eger, Thomas and Weise, Peter, Some Limits to the Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Grumbler's View on Harm and Damages in Hardcore Price Cartel Cases (2010). Global Competition Litigation Review, Issue 4, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2162461

Thomas Eger (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/thomas_eger/

Peter Weise

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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