Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair

28 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2012

See all articles by Henry S. Schneider

Henry S. Schneider

Smith School of Business, Queen's University

Date Written: September 2012

Abstract

Using a field experiment involving undercover visits to auto repair garages with a test vehicle, I first examine how asymmetric information between mechanics and motorists over auto repair service quality affects outcomes. I then examine whether reputation mitigates these problems via a matched‐pair treatment in which undercover researchers appeared as either one‐time or repeat‐business customers. The results indicate that under and overtreatment are widespread, and that reputation via a repeat business mechanism does not improve outcomes significantly.

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Henry S., Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair (September 2012). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 60, Issue 3, pp. 406-433, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2163380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00485.x

Henry S. Schneider (Contact Author)

Smith School of Business, Queen's University ( email )

143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario
Canada

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
570
PlumX Metrics