Farsightedly Stable Matchings

16 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2012

See all articles by Nikita Roketskiy

Nikita Roketskiy

University College London - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 30, 2012


We study the properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in application to matching models. We show that the result by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) for hedonic games can be extended to a general matching with contracts framework: a collection of singleton stable sets constitutes a weak core of the matching with contracts game. We also show that singleton stable sets are invariant under diff erent contractual languages.

Suggested Citation

Roketskiy, Nikita, Farsightedly Stable Matchings (September 30, 2012). NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2165474 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2165474

Nikita Roketskiy (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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