Download This PaperFarsightedly Stable Matchings
16 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2012
Date Written: September 30, 2012
Abstract
We study the properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in application to matching models. We show that the result by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) for hedonic games can be extended to a general matching with contracts framework: a collection of singleton stable sets constitutes a weak core of the matching with contracts game. We also show that singleton stable sets are invariant under diff erent contractual languages.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Roketskiy, Nikita, Farsightedly Stable Matchings (September 30, 2012). NET Institute Working Paper No. 12-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2165474 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2165474
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