CISG and CESL

Liber Amicorum Ole Lando, pp. 225-255, Michael Joachim Bonell, Marie-Louise Holle, and Peter Arnt Nielsen, eds., Djøf Forlag, 2012

Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 12/27

32 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2012

See all articles by Ulrich Magnus

Ulrich Magnus

c/o Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Date Written: September 1, 2012

Abstract

The subject of this paper – which is dedicated to Ole Lando – is to examine the relationship between the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 1980 and the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) which the EU Commission published on 11 October 2011 and to compare both instruments. However, only major differences will be discussed, primarily with respect to the regulations for businesses. The focus lies on the objectives, opt-in and opt-out approach, scope of application, structure, and style of regulation of both sets of rules. The conflict of laws problem will be addressed, as well as specific matters such as the rules regarding formation of contract, and the rights and obligations of the parties.

This contribution is published in this Research Paper Series as a part of the Liber Amicorum Ole Lando with the generous and exceptional permission of the rights owner, Djøf Forlag.

Keywords: CISG, CESL, scope of application, European regulations, conflict of laws problem, style of regulation, formation of contract, rights and obligation of the parties, sales contracts

Suggested Citation

Magnus, Ulrich, CISG and CESL (September 1, 2012). Liber Amicorum Ole Lando, pp. 225-255, Michael Joachim Bonell, Marie-Louise Holle, and Peter Arnt Nielsen, eds., Djøf Forlag, 2012, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 12/27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2165758

Ulrich Magnus (Contact Author)

c/o Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, D-20148
Germany

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