Die Libor-Manipulation zwischen Kapitalmarktrecht und Kartellrecht (LIBOR Manipulation: Between Capital Markets Law and Competition Law)

Der Betrieb, Vol. 65, No. 45, pp. 2561-2568, 2012

Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 12/28

Posted: 31 Oct 2012

See all articles by Holger Fleischer

Holger Fleischer

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Eckart Bueren

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Date Written: October 1, 2012

Abstract

The alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) by large number of banks is currently under investigation by regulators in Europe and the US. Various lawsuits are adding to the evidence of LIBOR rigging that first emerged from a settlement between Barclays Bank and the Financial Services Authority in June 2012. This paper seeks to bring together and build on this evidence, analysing the legal consequences of LIBOR rigging under German, British and European Law. It first examines whether this conduct can be regarded as market manipulation as defined by German, British and European Capital Markets Law, and then goes on to analyse LIBOR rigging under Competition Law, in particular under Art. 101 TFEU. By doing so, it also highlights the under-researched interface between Capital Markets Law and Competition Law.

Please note that this is an article published in German.

Keywords: LIBOR manipulation, market manipulation, capital markets law, competition law, price fixing

Suggested Citation

Fleischer, Holger and Bueren, Eckart, Die Libor-Manipulation zwischen Kapitalmarktrecht und Kartellrecht (LIBOR Manipulation: Between Capital Markets Law and Competition Law) (October 1, 2012). Der Betrieb, Vol. 65, No. 45, pp. 2561-2568, 2012, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 12/28, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2165783

Holger Fleischer (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Eckart Bueren

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, D-20148
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
871
PlumX Metrics