Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County

45 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2012 Last revised: 27 Oct 2012

Nicholas Petersen

University of Miami ; University of California, Irvine

Mona Lynch

University of California, Irvine - Department of Criminology, Law and Society

Date Written: October 23, 2012

Abstract

This article analyzes the processing of homicide cases in Los Angeles County from 1996 to 2008 to measure the time-costs of pursuing cases capitally and to examine how prosecutorial discretion in homicide charging is exercised in this jurisdiction. To answer these questions, we explore two related outcomes: (1) the odds of a “death-notice” filing and (2) time-to-resolution. According to Model 1, death-eligible cases with multiple special circumstances are significantly more likely to be prosecuted capitally than those with only one special circumstance. In light of the limited financial information regarding capital punishment at the county level, Models 2-4 utilize Cox Proportional Hazard regression to investigate the time-costs associated with death-eligibility. Estimates indicate that capital cases take significantly longer to reach resolution than noncapital cases. Furthermore, the filing of special circumstances increases survival time in noncapital cases. In addition to highlighting the time-costs of trying cases capitally, these findings reveal those associated with the prosecution of special circumstance cases, even when the death penalty is not ultimately sought. By examining capital costs at the county level, this analysis contributes to the ongoing policy reform debate in California that aims to address the state’s “dysfunctional” death penalty system.

Keywords: capital punishment, death penalty, prosecutorial discretion, costs

Suggested Citation

Petersen, Nicholas and Lynch, Mona, Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County (October 23, 2012). Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 102, No. 4, 2012; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper, 2012-71. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166018

Nicholas Petersen

University of Miami ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33124
United States

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Campus Drive
Irvine, CA 62697-3125
United States

Mona Lynch (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Criminology, Law and Society ( email )

2340 Social Ecology 2, RM
Irvine, CA 92697
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
279
Rank
86,437
Abstract Views
1,433