Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Strategically Equivalent Contests

17 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2013

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Department of Economics

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Date Written: October 23, 2012

Abstract

We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Sheremeta, Roman M., Strategically Equivalent Contests (October 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166077 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166077

Subhasish Chowdhury

Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Roman Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
161
Rank
158,793
Abstract Views
460