Strategically Equivalent Contests

17 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2013

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Date Written: October 23, 2012

Abstract

We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Sheremeta, Roman M., Strategically Equivalent Contests (October 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166077 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166077

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
158
Rank
153,361
Abstract Views
432